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ECJ in Bayer Allows Pharmaceutical
Companies to Increase Profits by
Breaking Down European Union
Cohesion-With Just One Pill
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and
Commission of the European Communities v. Bayer AG
("Bayer")', the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") gave "non-
dominant" companies2 the power to restrict the gray-market
(parallel) trade of their products between European Union
("EU") member states. On its face, Bayer simply pertains to the
parallel trade of pharmaceutical products, but its holding could
significantly impact trade within the EU. Bayer was wrongly
1. Case C-2/01, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Comm'n v.
Bayer AG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-23 [hereinafter Bayer].
2. Article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community specifically
forbids an "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it ... in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States." Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 86, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. A firm enjoys a dominant position when it has sufficient
market share to independently affect market conditions and prevent effective competition
for its products. See Case 22176, United Brands Company v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
65; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche and Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 7 38.
3. See European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies, at
http://www.eaepc.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2005), for an example of a non-dominate
company. See also WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grey-market (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005) (definition of "grey market"). For the purpose of this Note, wholesalers
engage in the gray-market trade purchase goods in countries where they are less
expensive, and then import and sell them in countries where they are more expensive.
Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on
Patent Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217, 218 (2002). These wholesalers operate through
distribution channels not authorized by the product's manufacturer or official distributor.
Id. Further, the trade in gray-market goods is not necessarily illegal. Id.
4. See Bayer, supra note 1.
5. See Catriona Hatton & Wim Nauwelaerts, Parallel Trade: Bayer Adalat Decision,
GLOBAL COUNS. MAG., Mar. 1, 2004, available at Westlaw, GLOBALCOUNSEL
database.
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decided because it weakens the EU's economic solidarity by
running contrary to the fundamental legal principles of the EU.
The holding is also likely to have a harmful impact upon
consumers.
This Note will establish that the Court reached a wrong
decision in Bayer by not recognizing the legal importance of
maintaining EU cohesion via promoting free trade within the
Union. Part II summarizes the facts behind Bayer and the Court's
holding. Part III analyzes the legal background of the parallel
trade dispute by providing a summary of other ECJ decisions
relating to parallel imports. Part IV shows that the legal principles
underscoring the creation of the EU provided for the creation of a
common market and the elimination of trade barriers between EU
member states. This section will further show that since the
original legal foundation remains as pertinent today as upon its
creation, the Court erred by failing to comprehensively analyze the
trade implications of its Bayer decision. Part V presents an
alternative way for Bayer to have been decided. Part VI concludes.
II. THE CASE
The facts of Bayer are similar to those surrounding the
current controversy in the United States regarding the importation
of lower-cost drugs from Canada into the United States.7 In Bayer,
a subsidiary of the Bayer Group manufactured and marketed a
cardiovascular drug sold under the brand name of "Adalat ' '8 or
"Adalate." 9 The price of Adalat varied substantially between EU
member states because each state set its own market price. 10 For
instance, between 1989 and 1993, the state-set price of Adalat in
Spain and France averaged forty percent less than the price fixed
in the United Kingdom.
Gray-market wholesale traders capitalized upon these price
differences by exporting Adalat to the United Kingdom from
6. This Note will not address whether the Court of Justice of the European
Communities [hereinafter ECJ or European Court of Justice] erroneously rejected the
European Commission's argument that an agreement was in existence between Bayer and
its distributors, nor whether Bayer occupied a dominate position in the marketplace.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Okla. 2003).
8. The drug will henceforth be referred to as Adalat and the subsidiary will simply
be referred to as Bayer.




Spain (beginning in 1989) and France (beginning in 1991).12 These
wholesalers were so successful that Bayer's United Kingdom
subsidiary reported a decrease in sales of almost fifty percent
between 1989 and 1993." Consequently, by 1991, Bayer created a
system of excise duties that penalized wholesalers in France and
Spain who exported their products to England, thereby
discouraging the importation of low-cost Bayer products from
those countries into England. 4
Bayer's efforts to eliminate these parallel imports did not go
unnoticed by the antitrust authorities. On January 10, 1996, the
European Commission15 issued a decision, finding that Bayer
violated Article 81(1) (former Article 85(1)) of the EC Treaty by
restricting competition and adversely affecting trade between EU
states." The Commission held that Bayer's conduct was
tantamount to an export ban implicitly incorporated into Bayer's
dealings with wholesalers in France and Spain. Thus, the
Commission concluded that Bayer's actions limited trade between
EU member countries. 9
The ECJ, however, sided with Bayer and set aside the
Commission's decision.20 The ECJ held that Bayer's policy of
reducing exports did not constitute an "agreement" for purposes
of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, as Bayer did not make an explicit
offer to its distributors to fulfill an anti-competitive goal.21
Furthermore, the ECJ found that firms unilaterally restricting
parallel exports could be punished only when the firm occupies a
dominant position in the marketplace. Hence, the ECJ concluded
12. Id. 3.
13. See id. 2.
14. See id. 4.
15. The Commission of the European Communities [hereinafter European
Commission] is an executive body of the European Union [hereinafter EU] charged with
working to assure an "ever-closer union" of EU member countries. One of its primary
functions is to promote the free movement of goods throughout the EU. See Peter
Ludlow, The European Commission, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 85, 85-88, 96
(Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991).
16. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 81(1). EC Treaty, Article 85(1), as cited in Bayer,
will be referred to in this note by its current name, Article 81(1).
17. Bayer, supra note 1, 1$ 3-6.
18. Id. 5-10.
19. Id.
20. See id. j 147.
21. See id. 1 88.
22. See id. j 70.
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that Bayer could act independently to restrict the gray-market
trade of its products within the EU.--
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
No international treaty expressly allows or prohibits parallel
imports.24 Thus, under the international law doctrine that permits
otherwise non-proscribed conduct,25 it is necessary to determine
whether any state or regional laws restrict gray-market trade.
Article 81(1) sets out the basic rule against anti-competitive
behavior in the EU by prohibiting agreements and practices that
limit trade. 26 This is the primary tool used to combat non-
monopolistic companies that restrict the gray-market trade of their
products.27 The elements to satisfy an Article 81 claim are: (1) theS 28
existence of undertakings (2) that collude together and come to
an agreement (3) that is intended or has the effect of distorting or
restricting competition between EU states, and (4) that actually
does affect trade.29 An agreement must have an appreciable effect
23. See id.
24. See Catalin Cosovanu, Note, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The
Software Sector in Eastern Europe and Other Emerging Markets, 5 COLUM. SCl. & TECH.
L. REV. 3, 21-22 (2003).
25. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
26. EC TREATY art. 81 ("The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market .... ").
27. The Court did not apply Article 82 (former Article 86) in this case because the
Court ruled that Bayer was not a dominate firm. Bayer, supra note 1, 70. Additionally, it
is unclear whether the activities in this case would rise to the level of abusive conduct that
article 82 is intended to prevent. Article 82 prohibits "abusive exploitation" by dominate
firms; in other words, a dominate firm that oppresses buyers and sellers who have no
choice but to deal with the firm (such as by overpricing products). VALENTINE KORAH,
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (7th ed. 2000).
See EC Treaty art. 82 ("Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States ... ").
28. An undertaking is any entity involved in economic activity. Case C-364/92, Sat
Fluggesellschaft mbH v. European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 1994
E.C.R. 1-43, 18 (1994).
29. ALLISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW 86 (2001); T. R.
OTTIERVANGER, ET AL., COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE
NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM 41 (1998).
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on trade and competition to be illegal: this requirement is not
mandated within the treaty, but is created by case law.3 °
While it was not an issue in Bayer, trademark laws can also
impact parallel trade because intellectual property laws influence
the ability to resell a manufacturer's product.3  The Trade Mark
Directive harmonizes the laws of member states to ensure that
safeuards to trademark protection are consistent throughout the
EU. On its face, Article 7 of The Trade Mark Directive implies
33that parallel trade prohibitions are illegal. While European courts
generally agree, trade restrictions may nonetheless be permitted.34
The ECJ has held that Article 7 must be applied in connection
with Article 30 of the European Community Treaty35 which
establishes the rules governing the free movement of goods and
trade by prohibiting "quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect. 3 6 Despite language that is
clearly favorable to free trade, trade prohibitions or restrictions
may be justified on several grounds, such as the protection of
intellectual property rights.37
As shown by the decision in Bayer, the ECJ evidently agrees
with those who suggest that parallel trade restrictions by private
firms, particularly in pharmaceutical goods, should be exempted
from laws favoring free trade. In fact, Bayer's holding ran
30. Case 5/69, V61k v. Vervaecke 1969 E.C.R. 295. The Notice on Agreements of
Minor Importance does not fall within the meaning of EC Treaty Article 81(1). 1997 O.J.
(C 372/13). See also OTTERVANGER, supra note 29, at 25.
31. Hugh Brett, Parallel Imports in Europe, http://scientific.thomson.com/knowtrend/
ipmatters/euroiss/82029141 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
32. SHELDON BURSHTEIN, ET AL., THE USE OF ANOTHER'S TRADEMARK: REVIEW
OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND WESTERN EUROPE 97 (1997).
33. First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) art. 7 [hereinafter
Trademark Directive] (stating in relevant part that a trademark "shall not entitle the
proprietor to prohibit its use in relations to goods which have been put on the market in
the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.").
34. See generally Bayer, supra note 1 (the ECJ admits that parallel export restrictions
by the government are illegal, but holds that similar restrictions by a private firm are
illegal only if they are imposed by a firm with a dominate position in the marketplace).
35. LORNA WOODS, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 156-7 (2004).
36. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 28.
37. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 30.
38. See generally Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 185 (1999); Shanker A. Singham,
Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface between
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contrary to previous case law, as the Bayer court took a far more
conservative interpretation of what constituted an agreement than
had prior courts.3 9 While Bayer is the first company to successfully
oppose parallel trade in a European court, 4° Bayer is not the first
case in which European courts allowed an organization's narrow
commercial interests to discourage trade between European
41
states .
For example, the Court of First Instance struck down a fine
on the automaker Volkswagen for having sent letters to its dealers
in Germany, advising them not to sell cars below a recommended
42
price and to offer consumers little or no discounts. Volkswagen,
like Bayer, relates to parallel trade because the European
Commission found that Volkswagen's unilateral actions were
"particularly liable to have an appreciable effect on trade between
Member States., 43 Specifically, the Commission reasoned that
Volkswagen's actions would encourage Germans to purchase cars
in other countries and import them to Germany, while the price of
German car exports would remain uncompetitive elsewhere.
44
Despite the fact that Volkswagen's policy was clearly intended to
affect parallel trade, the ECJ found that Volkswagen did not
violate any EU laws.4 ' Thus, both Volkswagen and Bayer are
viewed by legal experts as examples whereby the EU's ability to
prohibit a firm's restrictions on parallel imports was substantially
impacted.46
Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
363, 407 (2000) ("parallel trade has particularly pernicious effects to the pharmaceutical
industry.").
39. Sophie Lawrance & Pat Treacy, Parallel Trade in the Pharma Sector: Where Now
for Stock Management, MONDAQ (June 15, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 9487090.
40. Research and Markets: The Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade Outlook: Challenges to
Pharmaceutical Companies across Europe and the US, BUSINESS WIRE, Apr. 28, 2004,
available at Westlaw, BWIRE database.
41. See JUKKA SNELL, GOODS AND SERVICES IN EC LAW 146 (2002) ("[Alctions by
a single non-dominant firm or agreements between firms having only an insignificant
effect on the market do not fall under competition rules.").
42. Case T-208/01, Volkswagen v. Comm'n (2004), http://europa.eu.int.
43. Case 2001/711/EC, Comm'n Decision of 29 June 2001 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 - Volkswagen), 2001 O.J. (L
262) 85, 86.
44. Id.
45. Case T-208/01, Volkswagen v. Comm'n (2004), http://europa.eu.int.
46. James Calder, Supplement to the 2003 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review
Proceedings, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 379, 398 (2004).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The ECJ reached a flawed result in Bayer because it failed to
adequately consider the decision's harmful impact on trade within
the EU. The holding reaches beyond its immediate effect on
Bayer's distribution of products. While EU policymakers have
historically sought to create a single market, Bayer limits trade
between member states and runs contrary to the fundamental
principle of European unity and free trade that underlies the EU's
creation. In short, the ECJ should have ruled against Bayer's
restrictive trade practices because the practices discouraged trade
between EU states.
A. The Legal Foundation of the EU was to Promote Cohesion,
Particularly in Trade, between Member States.
Some observers48 suggest that the prevention of war was the
primary gpurpose for the creation of the European Community
("EC"). Granted, the desire to reduce international tensions
between France and Germany in the post-World War II era led to
treaties and inter-European cooperation in the 1940s and 1950s
that later resulted in the EU's formation.0 However, a brief review
of the EC's and EU's historical records, including treaties,
demonstrates that the promotion of trade was the fundamental
reason the EU was formed.
For example, the Dooge Report, prepared by a special
commission created to envision the future of the EU, listed the
creation of a "homogeneous internal economic area" as a major
priority for the then-European Council. 1 The 1987 Single
European Act formally adopted this concept, as it was originally
47. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in E.C. Competition Policy, at exec. sum. p. i,
COM (1996) 721 final (Jan. 22, 1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
antitrust/96721en-en.pdf.
48. See EuroChicago.org, What is the European Community,
http://www.eurochicago.org/Pages/europe.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
49. These supporters can point to Winston Churchill's famous 1946 speech in which
he sought to create a "United States of Europe" that can dwell in "peace, in safety, and in
freedom" as being the fundamental reason for the EU's existence. Sir Winston Churchill,
Tragedy of Europe, Address at Zurich University (Sept. 19, 1946) (transcript available at
http://www.alliancefr.be/cd5/contenu/annexel/churen.htm).
50. See TIM BIRTWISTLE, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1 (2002).
51. DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 209
(2004).
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conceived to promote economic cooperation12 and solidarity
between member states.53 Likewise, the first goal listed on the
Treaty on European Union 4 is "to promote economic and social
progress ... in particular through the creation of an area without
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and
social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and
monetary union...."55
In short, the structure of the EU sought to create a free and
single market that would allow easy movement of goods, people,
services, and capital." In fact, the primary question during the
formation of the European Community was not whether, but how
to create a unified marketplace.57 Therefore, it is only natural that
free trade between EU member states is codified in EU law.
B. Regardless of the EU's Historical Background, a Firm Should
Not Be Allowed to Restrict Parallel Imports.
The insinuation18 that parallel imports should be discouraged
by treating them separately from other types of trade is incorrect
because European law encourages trade without expressly
discriminating between parallel and non-parallel trade. For
example, the EC Treaty prohibits "quantitative restrictions" on
exports and imports, and "all measures having equivalent effect."'5 9
This provision, on a prima facie basis, prohibits limitations on
parallel imports because the restrictions adversely affect trade.
European Courts, however, have not consistently reached the
same conclusion.
While the ECJ's jurisprudence in this area is still being
refined, it is clear that one test of a prohibited trade practice is
whether the practice favors the domestic market and has the
52. BIRTWISTLE, supra note 50, at 3.
53. DINAN, supra note 51, at 217-218, 225.
54. Commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty.
55. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
56. Case 270/80, Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shop, 1982 E.C.R. 329, 330 (stating
that the EEC Treaty is intended to "unite national markets into a single market having the
characteristics of a domestic market"); WOODS, supra note 35, at 3.
57. DINAN, supra note 51, at 207.
58. This is more than an insinuation, as it is the essence of Bayer's argument to the
Court that parallel imports should be evaluated differently from other types of imports.
See Court of First Instance Decision Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v. Commission of the
European Communities, 2000 E.C.R. 11-03383 IT 34-41.
59. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 28, 29.
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object or effect of restricting exports. 6° Parallel trade restrictions
meet both elements of this test because they restrict exports from
countries with lower prices. In addition, as in Bayer, these
restrictions allow products to remain less expensive in countries of
export, thereby favoring consumers in that country over countries
desirous of the gray-market imports.
1. Parallel Trade is Favored from a Policy Perspective.
The EU specifically prohibits gray-market trade bans in some
areas.61 For instance, certain EU regulations restrict parallel
trade.62 EU authorities seek to protect parallel trading6' because
they recognize that it breaks down national barriers and cements a
free market for trade.64
As part of their efforts to promote free trade throughout the
Union, European authorities are expected to continue pursuing
policies that are favorable to parallel trading even after the Bayer
decision.6' This is because parallel trade is no different from other
types of trade where trade restrictions can have "visual and
psychological" effects that lead to the partitioning of the
marketplace.6 In other words, any and all trade restrictions hinder
the formation of a single European market where goods can move
67
freely between countries.
60. Woods, supra note 35, at 101.
61. KORAH, supra note 27, at 231.
62. Any agreement that hinders parallel imports is not eligible for the streamlined
process to exempt the agreement from anti-competition laws. Commission Regulation
240/96 of 31 Jan. 1996 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain
Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31/2) art. 3(3).
63. See, e.g., A Stronger European-Based Pharmaceutical Industry for the Benefit of
the Patient, at 15-16 COM (2003) 383 final (Jan. 7, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2o03-0383en0l.pdf.
64. Julie S. Nazerali, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals: A Prescription for Success
or a Free Market Overdose, 19(6) E.C.L.R. 332, 342 (1998). For example, it has been a
long-standing practice to purchase medicines in Mediterranean Europe to resell in
northern Europe. Are Drug Firms Standing in the Way of Lower Prices, Irish Times (June
7,2005), available at Westlaw, IRISHT database.
65. Simon King, Drug Manufacturers Lose UK Re-Packaging Case, WORLD
MARKETS ANALYSIS, Mar. 8, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library.
66. OTrERVANGER, supra note 29.
67. See SNELL, supra note 41, at 50.
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2. EU Authorities have Punished Firms that Restrict Parallel
Trade.
The Bayer and Volkswagen cases stand out from traditional
EU jurisprudence that disfavors parallel trade restrictions. Since
the 1960s, European courts, including the ECJ, have upheld
sanctions against firms that suppress free trade within Europe.6
For instance, Volkswagen was fined for entering into agreements
with its dealers in Italy to restrict sales to consumers from other
member states.69 Like Bayer, Volkswagen used supply quotas to
accomplish an objective that the Commission labeled as a serious
infringement upon EU competition rules, because the quotas
partitioned a part of the common market. °
Additionally, the ECJ found efforts to prohibit the re-
importation of records to be illegal7' and disallowed distribution
72
agreements structured to control parallel imports. These cases
show that the EU authorities are willing to punish firms for
restricting parallel trade.
3. The Court Reached Its Erroneous Decision by Failing to
Properly Analyze Trade Implications.
The ECJ did not reach its decision in Bayer because it
disagreed with the arguments presented above. Rather, the Court
reached its decision because it was preoccupied with analyzing
other issues.
Only one paragraph of the 150-paragraph Bayer opinion
linked parallel trade to European cohesiveness.7' That paragraph
simply recited an argument made by two parties to the case. The
Court never addressed the arguments set forward in this Note
regarding the impact upon intra-European trade. Instead, the ECJ
quickly agreed with Bayer's arguments that gray-market trade
restrictions could be banned only if the manufacturer imposing the
restrictions had a dominate place in the market,7' or there was an
68. R.B. BOUTERSE, COMPETITION AND INTEGRATION-WHAT GOALS CouNT? 1, 1-
2 (1994).
69. Case T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 11-02707.
70. Id.
71. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 502.
72. Case C-279/87, Tipp-Ex GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R. 1-261.
73. Bayer, supra note 1, 66.
74. Id.




actual agreement between the parties to ban exports. Much of the
ECJ's analysis, therefore, revolved around the meaning of an
'agreement' for purposes of an antitrust violation." Significantly,
commentators citing the Bayer decision generally reference the
case in the context of an antitrust article or discussion.78
Furthermore, the ECJ consistently holds that any derogation
from a freedom given by a treaty, such as free trade, must be
interpreted restrictively. In other words, any parallel trade
restrictions should be subject to additional scrutiny because they
restrict treaties that support free trade.80 By contrast, the ECJ
seemingly did not analyze this issue with any particular scrutiny. In
fact, the Court likely did not even recognize this issue because the
ECJ, as illustrated earlier, merely glossed over the impact upon
European cohesiveness.
The ECJ's decision is likely a result of the Court failing to
consider, even cursorily, the larger European unity aspects of the
case.8 1 The Bayer court does not refute this Note's premise that
parallel trade restrictions should be allowed because of the
fundamental importance of encouraging European integration.
V. How COULD BAYER HAVE BEEN DECIDED? A FIRM'S
DOMINANCE IS IRRELEVANT TO THE PARALLEL TRADE ANALYSIS.
Article 81 prohibits agreements between firms and concerted
82
practices. A principle question in Bayer was whether an• 83 8
agreement existed. The ECJ ruled there was no agreement.
76. Id. 1 68 (restrictions made as a result of an agreement are prohibited by Article
81).
77. See id. T1 39-40.
78. See, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EU: Antitrust Heads East,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT EXECUTIVE BRIEFING, April 30,2004, available at 2004
WL 62069251. See also Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules:
Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431, 455
n.86 (2004); Calder, supra note 46, at 402-406.
79. Woods, supra note 35, at 109.
80. See discussion infra Part III.
81. Perhaps the Court adheres to the Chicago School of neoclassical economics - i.e.
only a limited number of cases should involve antitrust laws. DORIS HILDEBRAND,
ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF VERTICAL AGREEMENTS - A SELF ASSESSMENT 11 (2005).
82. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 81.
83. Bayer, supra note 1, T 141.
84. Id. J1 88 ("The mere fact that the unilateral policy of quotas implemented by
Bayer, combined with the national requirements on the wholesalers to offer a full product
range, produces the same effect as an export ban does not mean either that the
2006] Bayer
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However, regardless of whether an agreement existed, Bayer's
conduct could have been prohibited under Article 81 as aS 85
concerted practice, because a concerted practice does not depend
upon the existence of an agreement. 86 The Bayer decision does not
analyze this issue at all.
Three essential criteria must be met to find a concerted
practice violation of Article 81: the existence of (1) a concerted
practice between firms which (2) has the object or effect of
preventing, restricting, or distorting competition within the
common market, and (3) that actually does affect trade.87 The first
element is complex and will be analyzed in the next paragraph.
The second element is met because restrictions on conditions of
resale and export bans are deemed to reduce competition.8 The
third element is also clearly met, as parallel trade restrictions, by
their inherent nature, affect trade between member states.
Additionally, the minimum quantity exception for agreements that
have only a minor impact upon trade is not satisfied in this case.9O
A concerted practice has been defined by the ECJ as a "form
of coordination between undertakings which, without having
reached the stage where an agreement properly so called has been
concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between
them for the risks of competition." In short, a concerted practice
is mutual cooperation that leads to abnormal market conditions. 92
The three elements that constitute a concerted practice are: (1) a
positive contact between firms (2) that involves cooperation
contrary to the normal competitive processes (such as removing
uncertainty as to the future competitive conduct of an
manufacturer imposed such a ban or that there was an agreement prohibited by Article
85(1) of the Treaty.").
85. EC TREATY art. 81.
86. MARK FURSE, COMPETITION LAW OFTHE UK& EC 114 (2000).
87. OTFERVANGER, supra note 29, at 22.
88. See INNS OF COURT SCHOOL OF LAW, EC COMPETITION LAW IN PRACTICE 14-
17, 19 (2000); D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW 98 (2003) (referring several cases
and drawing the conclusion that "export bans are, by their nature, a restriction on
competition.").
89. See id. at 19.
90. See supra note 30. The market share of Adalat exceeds 15 percent, which placed it
outside the scope of this exception. Court of First Instance Decision Case T-41/96; Bayer
AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 2000 E.C.R. 11-03383, 1 26.
91. Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries v.Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 1 64.
92. OTrERVANGER, supra note 29, at 23.
390 [Vol. 28:379
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undertaking), (3) which has the effect of maintaining or altering
the commercial conduct of the firms.93
Bayer's conduct met these three elements and is, therefore, a
concerted practice. Bayer was in contact with the firms at issue
when, at a minimum, it changed its delivery policy and ceased
filling large orders from the wholesalers it identified as exportingS94
Adalat to other countries. Additionally, the activities between
Bayer and the distributors ran contrary to the normal commercial
processes which, through parallel trade, would have resulted in
lower prices across Europe.5 Therefore, this altered the exporting
practices of Bayer's distributors. Importantly, the Court found that
resellers had accepted their distributor's policies simply through
their regular contractual relations; thus, there was more than
simple unilateral conduct.96 Consequently, it should not be
necessary to determine if wholesalers benefited from the export
ban or if they sought to restrict competition.
A crucial consideration during this analysis is whether
competition is restricted.97 The outcome of the Bayer case was, in
part, due to Bayer's lack of dominance in the marketplace.9 8 This
factor has neither influenced the outcome of past cases, nor should
it have influenced the Bayer case.99 In fact, it would be incongruous
if a firm's activities became illegal only once it succeeded in
distorting natural trade practices. Thus, Bayer restricted
competition since it sought to reduce gray-market competition
with its products.
All elements showing that Bayer engaged in an Article 81
concerted practice have been met. The ECJ should have found a
93. See OTrERVANGER, supra note 29, at 22.
94. Bayer, supra note 1, J1 3-8.
95. Ceteris paribus, restrictions on competition result in consumers paying higher
prices. FURSE, supra note 86, at 8. Thus, if Bayer could restrict the gray-market trade in its
goods, consumers would inevitably pay higher prices. See EUROPEAN ASS'N OF EURO-
PHARM. COS., What is It?, http://www.eaepc.org/parallel-trade/what-is-it.php?n=2 (last
visited Oct. 23, 2005).
96. Case 107/82, Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v.
Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, 3154; see also KORAH, supra note 27, at 40.
97. SNELL, supra note 41, at 51.
98. Bayer, supra note 1, T 70 ("[U]nilateral measures taken by private undertakings
are subject to restrictions, by virtue of the principles of that Treaty, only if the undertaking
in question occupies a dominant position on the market, within the meaning of Article 86
of the Treaty, which is not the case here.").
99. See FURSE, supra note 86, at 120.
100. Id. at 120.
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violation of Article 81 and allowed the European Commission to
punish Bayer for restricting the gray-market trade in its products.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court's justification for granting a reprieve
to non-dominate manufacturers is not supported by treaty laws
that have historically promoted intra-European free trade. The
Court's focus on the antitrust aspects of this case likely precluded
it from closely analyzing the broader trade policy implications
discussed in this Note.
In order to ensure that the fundamental principles behind the
EU's creation survive in an unadulterated form, it is imperative
that the ECJ reverse its holding in Bayer and allow the EU to
sanction manufacturers-even those that do not have a dominate
place in the marketplace-that seek to put their commercial
motives over the paramount goal of ensuring full European
integration. While this Note did not analyze the consumer policy
implications of Bayer, it is self-evident that consumers benefit
from lower prices when gray-market trade is legal.
This Note presents an alternative way for Bayer's conduct to
be restricted. While the Court's analysis focused on whether an
agreement existed, the Court should have instead analyzed
whether Bayer made a concerted effort to affect the marketplace.
Had the Court performed this analysis, it would likely have found
reason to prohibit Bayer's restrictions on gray-market trade. Until
the ECJ corrects its holding in Bayer, European cohesiveness will
be weakened.
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